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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERSECTION OF SPORTS AND DISABILITY: ANALYZING
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR ATHLETES WITH
DISABILITIES

MAUREEN A. WESTON*

I. INTRODUCTION1
When thinking about athletes participating in competitive or organized
sports, typically the public rarely contemplates the inclusion of players with
medical impairments or other physical, mental, and learning disabilities. Yet
many athletes with disabilities, whether visible or hidden, have achieved
success in both amateur and professional sports. Although deaf, Kenny
Walker attained All-American status as a defensive tackle at the University of
Nebraska and went on to play professionally with the Denver Broncos. Jim
Abbot, who has only one arm as a result of a birth defect, successfully pitched
in the professional baseball leagues. The sporting public has applauded the
accomplishments of these athletes who are able to compete presumably
“despite” their disabilities or by “overcoming” them. The awa turned to
apprehension when Hank Gathers, who was medically cleared to play college
basketball despite a heart rhythm disorder, died on the court, or when twelveyear old Michael Montalvo, who has AIDS, sought to enroll in karate classes,
and even when Magic Johnson returned to professional basketball after
revealing that he was HIV positive.
The rights of athletes with medical impairments or disabilities to
participate in competitive sports are also increasingly controversial. Because
of a medical impairment or disability, some athletes cannot satisfy certain
eligibility requirements set by the governing sporting organizations or they
need accommodation in order to participate. Recent national attention has
* Associate Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. The Author would like to thank the
Center for Health Law Studies and the St. Louis University Law Journal for their support and
hosting of the Symposium on Sports Medicine, Doping, Disability and Health Quality, at which
an early version of this paper was presented.
1. This introduction is reproduced with permission, from Chapter 14, originally authored
by Maureen A. Weston, of RAY YASSER, JAMES R. MCCURDY, C. PETER GOPLERUD &
MAUREEN A. WESTON, SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 817–18 (5th ed. Copyright 2003
Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All Rights Reserved.).
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focused on Casey Martin, who suffers from a severe congenital disability
affecting his right leg, in his lawsuit seeking to compel the PGA Tour to permit
Martin to ride a cart during competitions although all other players are required
to walk.
Athletes who have been effectively excluded from sports participation
because of a medical impairment or disability have invoked the stringent antidiscrimination standards of federal disability laws in asserting rights to
participate and to reasonable modifications of eligibility standards in sports
programs at the interscholastic, intercollegiate, and professional levels.
Federal disability legislation, primarily through the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which applies to federally funded programs, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), whose broader coverage reaches most private
employers and private entities constituting places of public accommodations,
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability and further obligates these
entities to provide reasonable accommodations, modifications, or auxiliary aids
that will enable qualified individuals with disabilities to access and to
participate in the program or activity. 29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. § 12101. In
enacting the ADA, Congress found, inter alia, that individuals with disabilities
continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including “outright
intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation,
and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make
modifications to existing facilities, programs and practices, exclusionary
qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser
services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs or other opportunities.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(b). A goal of these laws, which apply to virtually all sports teams and
organizations, is to assure the equality of opportunity and full participation for
individuals with disabilities.
Federal disability laws have had and continue to have a significant impact
in sports, raising complicated and controversial medico-legal questions
surrounding the rights of individuals with disabilities to participate in athletics
and the concomitant rights and obligations of the entities regulating athletic
competition to set and enforce eligibility and safety rules. Many of the cases
involving disability law in sports have garnered intense public attention,
raising questions about the impact on the competitive nature of sports and the
ability of sporting organizations to enforce rules of participation.
II. PROHIBITIONS ON DISABILITY-BASED DISCRIMINATION AND
REQUIREMENTS FOR REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
A.

Historical Treatment of Athletes with Disabilities

Historically, athletes with medical impairments and disabilities had
minimal legal recourse to assert rights to participate in competitive sports. No
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such rights were recognized at common law, and Constitutional claims against
exclusion met limited success. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,2
the Supreme Court held that individuals with disabilities were not a quasisuspect class.3 As a result, public schools and institutions (as “state actors”)
could discriminate against or exclude disabled athletes from participation if
rationally related to a legitimate objective, such as to guard the health and
safety of athletes.4 On a due process level, there is no fundamental or
constitutional right to participate in competitive sports.5
B.

Federal Laws Prohibiting Disability-Based Discrimination and Requiring
Reasonable Accommodation

The need to recognize the rights of the disabled population began to
emerge on a national scale in the early 1970s, motivating Congress to enact
major federal legislation to recognize the civil rights of individuals with
disabilities.6
1.

The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA

Federal legislation, beginning with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
followed by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, provides qualified
disabled individuals with protection against discrimination on the basis of
disability and requires covered entities to provide reasonable accommodations
and to modify eligibility criteria that unfairly screen out persons with
disabilities.7 Recourse may also be available under state law disability-related
discrimination statutes, but enforcement and remedies vary by state.8 As a
result, most disability discrimination claims are based on the federal statutes
rather than on the U.S. Constitution.
2.

Basic Non-discrimination Mandate

The general prohibition of discrimination provides that “[n]o individual
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or

2. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
3. Id. at 442.
4. See id. at 446 (“To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes
between the [disabled] and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose.”); Matthew J. Mitten, Sports Participation by “Handicapped” Athletes, 10 ENT. &
SPORTS LAW. 15, 17 (1992).
5. See Mitten, supra note 4, at 17.
6. See Maureen C. Weston, The Road Best Traveled: Removing Judicial Roadblocks that
Prevent Workers from Obtaining Both Disability Benefits and ADA Civil Rights Protection, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 397 & nn.100–01 (1997).
7. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 721, 794 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12112, 12182 (2000).
8. See Weston, supra note 6, at 400 & nn.123–25.
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accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”9
Unlike other civil rights statutes that prohibit discrimination (for example,
on the basis of race, age, or gender), federal disability laws also impose an
affirmative obligation upon covered entities to comply with requests for
reasonable accommodations, as well as for modification of non-essential
eligibility criteria. For example, discrimination is defined by the statute to
include, inter alia,
the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out an individual with a disability . . . [and] a failure to make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications
are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations to individuals with disabilities.10

The ADA further requires that these “[g]oods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations shall be afforded to an individual
with a disability in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the
individual.”11 Exceptions are warranted only where the entity can demonstrate
that such criteria are necessary or that “making such modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations.”12
3.

Purposes

Participation in sports was not a specific focus of the federal legislation,
whose primary intent was to address employment and physical access issues.13
However, implementing regulations expressly require institutions to provide
qualified individuals with disabilities an equal opportunity to participate in
educational and nonacademic activities, including inter-collegiate athletics.14
Moreover, the legislation’s overarching purpose, to eradicate unfounded
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000) (emphasis added). The same basic definitions, protections,
and obligations apply under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. For ease of reading, references
to the ADA herein encompass the Rehabilitation Act. See Weston, supra note 6, at 399 n.115.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (emphasis added).
11. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(B) (requiring integrated settings).
12. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
13. See id. § 12101; cf. Donald H. Stone, The Same of Pleasant Diversion: Can We Level the
Playing Field for the Disabled Athlete and Maintain the National Pastime, in the Aftermath of
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin: An Empiral Study of the Disabled Athlete, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 377,
381 (2005) (“It appears that Congress intended to protect athletes with disabilities from
discrimination in various areas of sports.”). Stone further notes the application of disability laws
to athletics at all stages: professional sports leagues, public schools and universities, and athletic
associations. Id.
14. Maureen A. Weston, Academic Standards or Discriminatory Hoops? LearningDisabled Student-Athletes and the NCAA Initial Academic Eligibility Requirements, 66 TENN. L.
REV. 1049, 1066 (1999) (citing 34 C.F.R. § 104.47 (2004)).
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stereotypes and exclusion resulting from overprotective rules and exclusionary
criteria, and to assert equal opportunity and full participation for persons with
disabilities,15 is equally applicable in the sports area.
C. Stating a Disability Rights Claim: An Athlete’s Prima Facie Case
Athletes with disabilities may seek protection under, and athletic programs
are required to comply with, either of the two primary federal laws that
prohibit disability-based discrimination. To obtain such protection under
either the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, an athlete must establish four elements.
First, the program is a “covered entity” under the law.16 Second, the athlete is
“disabled” within the meaning of the statute.17 Third, the athlete is “otherwise
qualified” to participate, with or without reasonable accommodation.18
Finally, the athlete was discriminated against (excluded from participation)
because of disability.19
1.

Athletic Programs, Leagues, and Organizations as “Covered Entities”

The initial element of an athlete’s claim must establish that the defendant,
school, program, or entity is a “covered entity” as defined under either the
Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.20 The Rehabilitation Act applies to recipients
of federal funds, which generally include public programs, schools, colleges,
or universities.21 The ADA broadens the scope of coverage to private entities
and places of public accommodation.22 The ADA is codified under five titles.
Title I applies to employment.23 Title II applies to public programs and
services, here governing entities that are publicly funded at the state or local

15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
16. See, e.g., id. § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination in employment).
17. See, e.g., id.
18. See, e.g., id.
19. See, e.g., id.
20. See supra text accompanying note 16.
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000) (requiring nondiscrimination under federal grants and
programs and providing that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely
by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance”).
22. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12132, 12182(a) (2000).
23. Id. § 12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with
a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”); id. § 12113(b) (“The term ‘qualification
standards’ may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health
or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”).
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level.24 Title III applies to private entities constituting places of public
accommodation.25 Public schools and universities are unquestionably covered
under the mandates of Title II or of the Rehabilitation Act, and private
universities are also covered under Title III as places of public
accommodation.
A highly litigated issue has involved determining whether private sports
leagues, associations, or athletic standard-setting or membership organizations
are “places of public accommodation” subject to the ADA.26 The ADA
defines the term “public accommodation” by listing a host of “private entities”
with operations that affect commerce.27 The list of private entities includes
twelve categories, which in turn contain over fifty examples of covered
facilities, including “a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or
other place of exercise or recreation.”28
Some courts strictly interpret the statutory language, holding that the terms
“facility” and “place” in the ADA require a physical structure. For example, in
Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey,29 a Missouri federal district court held that a youth
hockey league and its national governing body did not constitute places of
public accommodation.30 In that case, the league refused to permit a child with
Attention Deficit Disorder to play hockey.31 In dismissing the claim, the court
reasoned that the plaintiff had failed to show he was denied access to a place of
public accommodation simply by alleging that he could not play in the league;

24. See id. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”); id. § 12131(2)
(“The term ‘qualified individual with a disability’ means an individual with a disability who, with
or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the essential
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity.”).
25. Id. § 12182 (prohibiting discrimination by public accommodations).
26. See, e.g., Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1218 (E.D. Wash. 2001) (“Federal
courts have struggled with the issue of whether Title III applies to organizations and services not
directly linked to a physical place or facility.”).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The initial portion of the statute reads as follows: “Public
Accommodation. The following private entities are considered public accommodations for
purposes of this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect commerce—[Subparagraphs
(A) through (L) list twelve categories of public accommodations].” Id.
28. Id. § 12181(7)(L) (emphasis added).
29. 922 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
30. Id. at 223; see also Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge, 959 F. Supp.
496, 498–99 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that group sponsoring and organizing bike race was not a
place of public accommodation subject to the ADA and upholding its refusal to permit disabled
cyclist to participate for his failure to wear a bicycle helmet).
31. Elitt, 922 F. Supp. at 218.
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that is, he had not shown that he was denied access to the ice rink itself.32 The
Sixth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion, holding that neither a state high
school athletic association nor the National Football League (“NFL”) were
“places” of public accommodation, even though association and NFL events
were held at “places” of public accommodations.33
Other courts take a broader view, holding that Title III is not limited to
physical structures.34 For example, in Shultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League,
Inc.,35 a California federal district court held that a youth baseball league and
its organizing body were covered by the ADA.36 In so doing, the court ruled
that “Title III’s definition of ‘place of public accommodation’ is not limited to
actual physical structures with definite physical boundaries.”37 The court in
Bowers v. NCAA38 came to a similar conclusion. Although acknowledging that
the NCAA is an unincorporated and voluntary membership organization of
approximately 1,200 postsecondary educational institutions, and not a “place”
of public accommodation, the Bowers court emphasized that the ADA

32. Id. at 223; see also Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312,
1321 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (holding internet website not a place of public accommodation required to
accommodate blind person and interpreting that a public accommodation must be a physical,
concrete structure); Brown, 959 F. Supp. at 498 (noting that “place of public accommodation” is
defined in the ADA regulations as a “facility” which falls within at least one of twelve listed
categories and that “facility” is defined as “all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites,
complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking
lots or other real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure or
equipment is located”).
33. See Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1028, 1036–37 (6th Cir.
1995) (upholding refusal to modify age limit for athlete with learning disabilities);
Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583–84 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding the
NFL and its member clubs do not fall within any of the twelve public accommodation categories
and dismissing claims by hearing-impaired individuals challenging “blackout rule” barring live
televised game broadcasts during non sold-out games).
In Sandison, the court held that Title III did not apply to high school athletic events
which occurred at public parks and schools, stating that statutory language limiting places of
public accommodations to private entities “compel[s] the conclusion that the applicability of
[T]itle III turns not so much on who is covered: ‘any person’ leasing or operating a place of
public accommodation is covered[.]” 64 F.3d at 1036. “The critical inquiry will typically be the
nature of the place to which the disabled individual alleges unequal access.” Id.
34. See, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New Eng., Inc.,
37 F.3d 12, 18–20 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that “public accommodation” within meaning of Title
III of the ADA includes more than physical structures, thus encompassing a trade association for
a health benefit plan: “It would be irrational to conclude that persons who enter an office to
purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase the same services over the
telephone or by mail are not.”).
35. 943 F. Supp. 1222 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
36. Id. at 1223, 1225.
37. Id.
38. 9 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.N.J. 1998).
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prohibits more than just discrimination based on physical access.39 As the
chief entity responsible for governing intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA was
found to control, manage, and regulate participation in intercollegiate sports
through, inter alia, its eligibility rules.40 Accordingly, the court found the
NCAA subject to Title III by interpreting “operating” a place of public
accommodations in terms of the entity’s power to control, manage, or regulate
the place and conditions causing the alleged discrimination.41
In PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,42 the Supreme Court of the United States had
the opportunity to clarify the issue. In that case, a disabled professional golfer
sued the PGA, alleging that the PGA’s rule banning the use of golf carts
violated the ADA.43 The Court held that this rule did, as applied to plaintiff
Casey Martin, violate the ADA.44 With respect to the coverage issue, the
Court provided a cursory analysis, noting that the Tour occurred on a golf
course, which is a type of public accommodation specifically listed in the
relevant statute,45 and that the PGA “leased” and “operated” golf courses.46
The PGA admitted that its tournaments were conducted at places of public
accommodation.47 Even without squarely addressing the debate of whether a
“place of public accommodation” requires a physical “place,” the Court
presumed that the ADA applied to the PGA because the Tour leased and
operated golf courses to conduct its tournaments.48
Post-Martin, a federal district court held in Matthews v. NCAA49 that the
NCAA was a “public accommodation” and therefore subject to Title III of the
ADA, due to the NCAA’s close connection with stadiums and physical
facilities.50 The court concluded that the “NCAA’s policies and eligibility
criteria in fact have a direct link to a place: a football stadium, which provides

39. Id. at 467, 483, 488.
40. Id. at 487–89.
41. See id. at 486; see also Weston, supra note 14, at 1090–91.
42. 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
43. Id. at 664–65.
44. Id. at 690; see discussion infra Part III.C.
45. PGA, 532 U.S. at 677 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L)
(2000)).
46. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)). By the time the case had reached the Supreme Court,
the PGA had essentially abandoned its earlier argument that the tour was a private club and thus
altogether exempt from Title III’s coverage. Id. at 677–78; see also Martha Lee Walters &
Suzanne Bradley Chanti, When the Only Way to Equal Is to Acknowledge Difference: PGA Tour,
Inc. v. Martin, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 727, 735–36 (2002) (noting that “with little plumbing, the Court
determined that the PGA was indeed a place of public accommodation covered by Title III and
Casey Martin was a person entitled to its benefits”).
47. PGA, 532 U.S. at 677.
48. Id.
49. 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (E.D. Wash. 2001).
50. Id. at 1223.
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a place of exercise and a public gathering—a public accommodation explicitly
enumerated in the ADA’s text.”51 Although the Supreme Court did not
squarely address the application of Title III to non-physical, standard-setting
athletic organizations or associations, the broad interpretation taken by courts
in subsequent decisions indicates a trend to hold organizations that effectively
“control” access to participation via participation and eligibility rules within
the definition of place of public accommodation under the ADA.52 Thus, a
sports league or organization may be subject to Title III where it “operates” a
place of public accommodation by controlling participation via league rules.53
2.

The “Disabled” Athlete

Assuming an athlete overcomes the initial hurdle of establishing that the
particular entity or organization is covered by federal law, the athlete seeking
protection under the ADA must be “disabled” within the meaning of the
statute.54 This requires that the athlete has “a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual.”55 The ADA’s regulations describe “major life activities” as
“functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”56 This definition
excludes individuals with temporary injuries, medical impairments, or
disabilities that do not substantially limit a major life activity.57
With respect to athletes excluded from sports participation based on
permanent medical ineligibility, a critical inquiry is whether sports
participation is a “major life activity.” An athlete may also argue that the list
of major life activities is non-exhaustive, leading the parties to argue whether
participation in sports is a major life activity or integral to learning. For
example, the Seventh Circuit has held that although a student was medically
ineligible to play college basketball because of a heart condition, he was not
51. Id.; see also Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 483–84 (D.N.J. 1998); Shultz v.
Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that youth
baseball league and its organizing body were covered by the ADA: “Title III’s definition of ‘place
of public accommodation’ is not limited to actual physical structures with definite physical
boundaries. . . . Defendants are a ‘place of public accommodation’ under the ADA irrespective of
their link to any physical facilities.”).
52. See Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1218–20.
53. See, e.g., Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1995)
(interpreting “operate” with its “ordinary and natural meaning. . . . [which is to] control or direct
the functioning of[;] . . . [t]o conduct the affairs of; manage”) (citations omitted).
54. See supra text accompanying note 17.
55. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000); see also id. § 12102
(2)(B)–(C) (including individuals with “a record of such impairment” or “being regarded as
having such an impairment”).
56. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (2005).
57. See id. § 104.3(j)(1).
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“disabled” because he was only limited in playing intercollegiate athletics, by
itself not a major life activity.58 Perhaps where the exclusion from athletics is
framed as substantially limiting the major life activity of learning or working,
the disability prong is more easily satisfied. For example, athletes with
learning disabilities are covered because their impairments restrict the major
life activity of learning.59 A professional athlete excluded because of disability
could also link the limitation to the life activity of working. However,
exclusion from working at a particular job has not been considered a
substantial limitation on working.60
A person is also “disabled” under the ADA where such individual has a
“record of such impairment; or . . . [is] regarded as having such an
impairment.”61 This definition may cover athletes excluded on the basis of a
record of a medical impairment or genetic predisposition for a medical risk.
3.

Who is “Otherwise Qualified with or Without Reasonable
Accommodation”?

An apparent irony is that the athlete pursuing an ADA claim must not only
be “disabled,” but also “otherwise qualified” to participate in the athletic
program.62 Such an athlete is qualified if he or she can meet essential program
eligibility requirements “with or without reasonable modifications to [the
program’s] rules, policies, or practices.”63
4.

Excluded Because of Disability

Finally, the athlete must prove that he or she was discriminated against or
excluded from participation because of disability.64 As mentioned previously,
discrimination is defined to include
the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out an individual with a disability . . . from fully and equally enjoying
any good, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations,
unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary . . . [and] a failure to make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures . . . to individuals
with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such [programs].65

58. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 480–81 (7th Cir. 1996); see also discussion
infra Part III.C.
59. See Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 475–76 (D.N.J. 1998).
60. See, e.g., Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that
major life activity does not necessarily mean working at a particular job such as firefighting).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)–(C) (2000).
62. See id. § 12132.
63. Id. § 12131(2) (defining “[q]ualified individual with a disability”).
64. See supra text accompanying note 19.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (emphasis added).
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D. In Defense, Legally Valid Justifications for Exclusion
In defense, exclusion is permissible where the requested accommodation
or modification is unreasonable, requires the elimination of essential eligibility
requirements, poses an undue hardship on the program, or fundamentally alters
the nature of the sport or competition.66 More recently, courts have ruled that
an entity need not permit participation where such poses a direct threat to the
player or others.67 Whether participation would pose a risk of harm to the
player or to others is a recurring issue facing many athletic programs when an
athlete has an increased risk of injury.
III. TYPE OF LEGAL CHALLENGES BY ATHLETES WITH DISABILITIES
The disability rights issue arises primarily in three types of cases. The first
occurs where athletes with high medical risk seek to participate. Liability and
safety concerns prevail where such players obtain medical clearance and die or
are injured while participating in the sports program, or where the players are
denied medical clearance to play and sue claiming disability-based
discrimination. The second category involves athletes who fail to meet a
“neutral” eligibility requirement, such as age or academic standards and are
denied participation in athletics. A third category involves athletes who need
accommodation or modification to the rules of play in the particular sport.
A.

Athletes with High Medical Risk Seek to Participate v. Protective
Concerns

Athletic programs, as well as courts, have to consider the eligibility and
participation rights of athletes with high medical risks balanced with the
program’s right to establish safety standards. A prerequisite to participating in
nearly any competitive athletic program is obtaining medical clearance and
signing medical release waivers. Challenges arise when athletes are willing to
execute medical release and liability waivers, but are excluded from
participation based on team assessments of medical ineligibility.
For example, in Knapp v. Northwestern University,68 the university
refused to allow Nick Knapp to play on the school’s Division I basketball team
based on the team physician’s determination that Knapp was medically
ineligible because of his increased risk of cardiac death, even while playing
Knapp sued Northwestern under the
with an internal defibrillator.69
66. See id.
67. See discussion infra Part III.C.
68. 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996).
69. Id. at 476–77. Nick Knapp was rated one of the best high school players in Illinois. Id.
at 476. At the end of his junior year, Northwestern offered him a basketball scholarship. Id.
During a pick-up game his senior year, Knapp had a sudden cardiac arrest where his heart
stopped. Id. Paramedics were able to revive him through electric shock. Id. Doctors thereafter
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Rehabilitation Act, arguing that he was discriminated against because of his
actual or perceived disability.70 The case raised a variety of questions, such as:
Was Knapp “disabled” by virtue of his increased risk of severe cardiac injury,
i.e., was he substantially limited in a major life activity and when can a
significant risk of future physical injury permissibly disqualify a person from
sports participation? When the parties’ medical experts disagree, who should
decide on an acceptable level of risk? Is it sufficient that Knapp was willing to
sign liability waivers and assume the personal risks (supported by his
physicians)?
At trial, five medical experts testified, disagreeing only on the issue of
whether, even with an internal defibrillator, the risk of cardiac death was
acceptable.71 The district court enjoined Northwestern from excluding Knapp
from playing on the team due to his cardiac condition.72 The district court
found that intercollegiate sports are integral to a student’s education and
learning process, and at a minimum, constituted a major life activity for
In concluding that Northwestern was in violation of the
Knapp.73
Rehabilitation Act, the district court stated the following:
Hardly a year goes by that there is not at least one instance of tragic death of a
healthy youth as a result of competitive sports activity. Life has risks. The
purpose of [the law], however, is to permit handicapped individuals to live life
as fully as they are able, without paternalist authorities deciding that certain
activities are too risky for them.74

implanted a cardio defibrillator in his abdomen designed to detect heart arrhythmia and restart his
heart in the event of a recurrence. Id. Northwestern agreed to honor the scholarship but refused
to allow him to play, finding him medically ineligible per the instruction of the team physician.
Id. at 476–77. Knapp and his parents were willing to sign liability releases and had his own team
of experts testify that the level of risk was acceptable. Id. at 476, 478.
70. Id. at 477, 478.
71. Id. at 484.
72. Id. at 487.
73. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 942 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1996). By affidavit,
Knapp stated:
My participation in competitive basketball has provided me and could continue to provide
me with a unique experience that I have not encountered in any other extracurricular
activity in which I have been involved . . . . Among other things, competitive basketball
has helped to instill in me the following character traits: confidence, dedication,
leadership, teamwork, discipline, perseverance, patience, the ability to set priorities, the
ability to compete, goal-setting and the ability to take coaching, direction and criticism.
Id.; see also Pahulu v. Univ. of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1392–93 (D. Kan. 1995) (applying a
subjective test, acknowledging that athletic participation could significantly contribute to a
student’s learning).
74. Knapp, 942 F. Supp. at 1197 (quoting Poole v. S. Plainfield Bd. of Ed., 490 F. Supp.
948, 953–54 (D.N.J. 1980)).
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On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed.75 First, the court held that Knapp,
although disqualified on the basis of medical ineligibility, was not
“disabled.”76 Although Knapp’s medical condition potentially substantially
limits him in “all” major life activities—if his heart stops—the court analyzed
his protection under grounds argued by the parties, ultimately ruling that
Knapp, although medically ineligible, was not “disabled” under federal
disability law because he was not substantially limited in a major life activity
(which the parties framed as learning).77 Although the district court found that
participation in sports was a major life activity integral to Knapp’s education,
the Seventh Circuit applied an objective, as opposed to subjective, standard of
whether participation in sports is integral to one’s learning.78
Even assuming Knapp were disabled, the court held that Knapp was not
“qualified” because of the substantial risk of injury.79 The parties implicitly
agreed that a person is not “qualified” if the disability poses a substantial risk
of injury to the student or to others.80 The problem in Knapp was determining
whose assessment of medical risk governs when the opinion of the team
physician and the player’s medical experts conflict—the player, the team, or
the court?81 Despite conflicting experts, the court concluded that the university
has the right to determine a student’s medical ineligibility, deferring to the
team physician decision as long as supported by “reason and rationality and
with full regard to possible and reasonable accommodations.”82
It did not make a difference to the court that Knapp and his parents were
willing to execute liability waivers or that the risk of injury was to Knapp
himself, a risk he was willing to take, as opposed to a risk posed to his
75. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 486 (7th Cir. 1996).
76. Id. at 482.
77. Id. at 480–82.
78. Id. at 480–81 (noting that Knapp, like other students, was capable of “learning” without
participation in intercollegiate sports). If Knapp were a professional athlete, perhaps his
“disability” would differ, having a stronger interest in participation because his livelihood, and
ability to work, would be at stake.
79. Id. at 482.
80. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 483.
81. See Matthew J. Mitten, Enhanced Risk of Harm to One’s Self as a Justification for
Exclusion from Athletics, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 189, 215 (1998) (asserting that a model according
deference to the team physician, if supported by a reasonable medical basis, appropriately
balances an athlete’s interest in participation and the team or sponsor’s interest in protecting the
health and safety of its participants); cf. Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 793–95
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (ordering the university to allow a student with sight in one eye to play football,
accepting the player’s ophthalmologist’s opinion that participation did not pose a substantial risk
of serious eye injury and rejecting the team physician’s contrary opinion). In Wright, the court
held that the university’s laudable concern for student safety cannot derogate from a student’s
rights under the Rehabilitation Act, “which prohibits ‘paternalistic authorities’ from deciding that
certain activities are ‘too risky’ for a handicapped person.” Id. at 794.
82. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 484.
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teammates.83 Some schools have reluctantly allowed athletes with heart and
other ailments to compete, but only after negotiating carefully drafted waivers
of liability.84
The Knapp court justified exclusion based on this risk of harm that
participation would pose to Knapp himself.85 The ADA provides a defense
when the disabled person poses a risk of harm to others, yet says nothing
regarding when the risk of harm is to one’s self.86 The Supreme Court,
however, has since clarified that the defense extends to a direct threat to self.87
Thus, the university was justified in its determination, provided that the
exclusion due to risk is based upon an individualized medical or scientific
determination, and not based on fear or even good intentions.88 The risk to self
versus others issue ties into the question about the participation and privacy
rights of athletes with contagious diseases, such as the AIDS virus. In
Montalvo v. Radcliffe,89 the court held it permissible to exclude a boy who was
HIV positive from participation in full contact karate classes because of the
significant risk to other participants’ health and safety.90 In ruling, the
Montalvo court noted the risk factors included the likelihood of blood-to-blood
contact; the unknown probability of HIV transmission; the severity of a fatal
disease; and the view of public health authorities that universal precautions
and/or eye coverings and gloves would not eliminate risk to an insignificant
level.91

83. See id. at 476.
84. Cf. Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d 968, 969–70 (Wash.
1988) (holding exculpatory releases of the school district’s negligence, signed as a condition of
participation in interscholastic athletics, invalid as contrary to public policy); Andrew Manno,
Note, A High Price to Compete: The Feasibility and Effect of Waivers Used to Protect Schools
from Liability for Injuries to Athletes with High Medical Risks, 79 KY. L.J. 867, 874–75 (1991)
(asserting that waivers may inadequately protect schools from liability if an athlete later
challenges on grounds of misrepresentation, fraud, incapacity, or contrary to public policy).
85. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 483.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000).
87. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86–87 (2002) (holding that EEOC
regulations authorizing the refusal to hire an individual whose performance on the job would
endanger his own health, due to a disability, did not exceed the scope of permissible rulemaking
under the ADA).
88. See Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Az. 1992)
(finding an ADA violation because no proof that on-field coaching in a wheelchair poses a direct
threat to others’ health and safety).
89. 167 F.3d 873 (4th Cir. 1999).
90. Id. at 874. See generally John T. Wolohan, An Ethical and Legal Dilemma:
Participation in Sports by HIV Infected Athletes, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 373 (1997); Anthony
DiMaggio, Comment, Suffering in Silence: Should They Be Cheered or Feared? (Mandatory HIV
Testing of Athletes as a Health and Safety Issue), 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 663 (1998).
91. Montalvo, 167 F.3d at 877–78.
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In summary, the Supreme Court in Knapp stated:
Legitimate physical qualifications may in fact be essential to participation in
particular programs. . . .
....
A significant risk of personal physical injury can disqualify a person from a
position if the risk cannot be eliminated. . . . But more than merely an elevated
risk of injury is required before disqualification is appropriate. . . . Any
physical qualification based on risk of future injury must be examined with
special care if the [law] is not to be circumvented, since almost all disabled
individuals are at a greater risk of injury.92

Courts tend to defer to the assessments of the team/athletic program to exclude
from participation athletes with severe medical impairments or even those at
high risk of medical impairments, provided the exclusion on the basis of direct
threat to the student or others is based on an individualized and scientific
determination, and not merely a subjective evaluation or good faith belief.93
92. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 482–83 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
See generally Matthew J. Mitten, Amateur Athletes with Handicaps or Physical Abnormalities:
Who Makes the Participation Decision?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 987 (1992) (addressing the conflicts
faced by disabled athletes, sports medicine physicians, and schools in determining whether the
athlete can participate in sports); Cathy J. Jones, College Athletes: Illness of Injury and the
Decision to Return to Play, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 113 (1992) (discussing whether college athletes
should be afforded the same rights as other adults in making decisions concerning their medical
care and daily activities); Adam A. Milani, Can I Play?: The Dilemma of the Disabled Athlete in
Interscholastic Sports, 49 ALA. L. REV. 817 (1998) (discussing the elements of the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act and their application to student-athletes); Matthew J. Mitten, Team Physicians
& Competitive Athletes: Allocating Legal Responsibility for Athletic Injuries, 55 U. PITT. L. REV.
129 (1993) (discussing pressures, obligations, and conflicts facing team physicians); Robert E.
Shepard, Jr., Why Can’t Johnny Read or Play? The Participation Rights of Handicapped StudentAthletes, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 163 (1991) (addressing the discriminatory and exclusionary
practices faced by handicapped athletes in collegiate sports).
93. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 648–49 (1998); see also Mantolete v. Bolger,
767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985). In Mantolete, the court addressed the standard to apply in
determining if an individual is otherwise physically qualified to perform an activity when the
possibility of future injury exists, stating that
in order to exclude such individuals, there must be a showing of a reasonable probability
of substantial harm. Such a determination cannot be based merely on an employer’s
subjective evaluation or, except in cases of a most apparent nature, merely on medical
reports. The question is whether, in light of the individual’s work history and medical
history, employment of that individual would pose a reasonable probability of substantial
harm.
....
In applying this standard, an employer must gather all relevant information regarding
the applicant’s work history and medical history, and independently assess both the
probability and severity of potential injury. This involves, of course, a case-by-case
analysis of the applicant and the particular job.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

152

B.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:137

Disabled Athletes Who Fail to Meet a “Neutral” Eligibility Requirement

In competitive sports, governing athletic organizations, teams, and schools
generally establish eligibility criteria, which are intended to protect the health
and safety of athletes and to maintain the integrity of the competition. When
universally applied, however, the effect of “imposition” of these seemingly
neutral eligibility criteria may be to screen out or exclude some athletes with
disabilities from participation. Thus, for example, neutral requirements such as
age limitations in interscholastic sports programs or academic eligibility
standards for participation in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics may
have the effect of discriminating against students who were held back in school
because of disability, or who could not meet the academic standards because of
specialized education courses or learning disabilities. Do these athletes with
disabilities excluded from participation on this basis have rights to participate,
or can the programs strictly enforce their eligibility standards?
1.

Age Restrictions

The federal courts are divided on whether interscholastic age eligibility
rules violate the federal anti-discrimination laws when applied to students who
exceed the age limits and were held back in school because of a disability. The
Sixth and Eighth Circuits have upheld age limitation rules, reasoning in part
that such rules are essential to promote the safety of younger athletes and to
maintain a competitive balance in interscholastic athletics by precluding
physically more mature students.94 According to these courts, waiver of the
rule would fundamentally alter the nature of interscholastic competition and
pose an undue administrative burden on the associations to assess competitive
fairness in individual cases.95 The Second and Eleventh Circuits declined to
address, on grounds of mootness,96 the merits of two cases in which the district
courts had enjoined enforcement of age rules.97
Id. at 1422–23.
94. See Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1037 (6th Cir.
1995) (holding the age limit rule did not violate either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA);
Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n., 40 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding the
age limit rule was an essential eligibility requirement supported by health and safety concerns and
that modification would be unreasonable).
95. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035 (“It is plainly an undue burden to require high school coaches
and hired physicians to determine whether . . . a student’s age [is] an unfair competitive
advantage. . . . It is unreasonable to call upon coaches and physicians to make these nearimpossible determinations.”); Pottgen, 40 F.3d at 930 (“Waiving an essential eligibility standard
would constitute a fundamental alteration in the nature of the baseball program. . . . [N]o
reasonable accommodations exist.”).
96. Claims by student athletes seeking rights to participate are usually made in the context of
a motion for preliminary injunction. Because of the short timing of the sports season, the
plaintiffs’ claims may quickly become moot whether injunctive relief is granted or not.
Accordingly, the courts test whether the plaintiff can demonstrate irreparable harm and a
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Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, Inc.98 emphasized that
the age requirement was a neutral rule applicable to all students and that the
plaintiffs were excluded from participation only in their senior years and
“solely by reason of” their age, not disability.99 The Court did not find it
relevant that the plaintiffs were delayed in their schooling as a result of their
learning disabilities.100 Johnson v. Florida High School Activities Ass’n,
Inc.101 focused on whether waiving the requirement fundamentally alters the
purposes of the rule.102 The courts differ on whether an athletic association is
obligated under federal law to conduct an individualized evaluation of whether
waiver of the age limit rule is a reasonable accommodation to a particular
student. Johnson conducted an individualized inquiry, analyzing whether
granting a waiver in the plaintiff’s individual case would undermine the
legitimate purposes of the age limit rule.103 A number of commentators
analyzing this issue have argued that the individualized approach taken by
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of an ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim. See
Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1030. The appeal in Sandison was not moot as to the penalty imposed on
schools, such as forfeiture of season games, for allowing students who exceed the age limit to
participate. Id.
97. See Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663, 670 (D.
Ct. 1996), vacated as moot, 94 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1996) (lower court recognizing that although
the age requirement was facially neutral with regard to disabilities, the rule was discriminatory
when applied to a particular student whose disability was the sole reason he was held back in
school; appellate court reversing and vacating as moot because plaintiff had participated under the
district court’s injunction and graduated); Johnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, Inc., 899 F.
Supp. 579, 585–86 (M.D. Fla. 1995), vacated as moot, 102 F.3d. 1172, 1173 (11th Cir. 1997)
(lower court conducting an individualized assessment and holding that waiver of the age rule was
a reasonable modification for the learning disabled student; appellate court vacating as moot
because Johnson was finished competing in high school athletics).
98. 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
99. Id. at 1032.
100. See id. at 1028.
101. 899 F. Supp. 579 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
102. Id. at 584. The Johnson court acknowledged the salutary purposes served by the age
limitation rule, but determined, based on an individualized assessment, that in Johnson’s case,
waiver of the age rule was a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 586. The court cited to factors
such as that the plaintiff was of average size and ability and did not intentionally delay his
education to get an athletic advantage. Id. at 585. The district court in Dennin used similar
reasoning in ordering a waiver of the age restriction to allow a nineteen-year-old student with
Down’s Syndrome to participate in intercollegiate swimming. 913 F. Supp. at 666, 669, 671.
The court ruled that a waiver would not undermine the purposes of the rule, given that the student
was not a safety risk in competitive swimming, a noncontact sport, and did not have a competitive
advantage, as one of the slowest swimmers on the team. Id. at 669; cf. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1037
(holding that requiring individual competitive fairness determinations is an undue administrative
burden). Arguably, this individualized assessment protects athletes who are not that good or
strong anyway and perhaps penalizes student athletes with disabilities who are exceptionally
skilled, strong, large, or talented.
103. 899 F. Supp. at 586.
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Johnson is more consistent with the purpose of the ADA and legislative
intent.104 This approach has gained increased recognition, notably adopted by
the Seventh Circuit in holding that waiver of a sports eligibility rule is a
“reasonable accommodation” under the ADA if waiver in the particular case
would not require a “fundamental and unreasonable change” in the rule.105
2.

Academic Requirements for Athletic Eligibility

Another area in which student-athletes with disabilities may be excluded
from participation is in the context of meeting academic requirements to attain
eligibility to participate in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics. For
example, the NCAA has established and enforced minimum initial academic
eligibility requirements that entering freshman must meet in order to
participate in Division I and II intercollegiate athletics.106 To qualify under
NCAA standards, students must satisfy initial eligibility requirements
including the completion of a certain number of high school “core” academic
courses and attaining a minimum score based on an index of a grade point
average in these courses on national standardized exams.107 The stated
purpose of these requirements is to protect the integrity of intercollegiate
athletics and to ensure, by uniform standards, that student-athletes are
academically prepared to succeed in college.108
Student-athletes with learning disabilities have claimed that imposition of
academic standards discriminate against them in violation of federal disability

104. See, e.g., Milani, supra note 92, at 907–08; John T. Wolohan, Are Age Restrictions a
Necessary Requirement for Participation in Interscholastic Athletic Programs?, 66 UMKC L.
REV. 345, 379–80 (1997); Katie M. Burroughs, Learning Disabled Student Athletes: A Sporting
Chance Under the ADA?, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 57, 65 (1997); Colleen M. Evale,
Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association: The Sixth Circuit Sets Up Age
Restrictions as Insurmountable Hurdles for Learning Disabled High School Student-Athletes, 5
SPORTS LAW. J. 109, 136–37 (1998).
105. See Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 842, 850 (7th Cir.
1999) (requiring individualized determination of waiver of eight-semester rule); see also Cruz v.
Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 485, 499–500 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(concluding that waiver of the maximum age rule for a learning disabled student would not
fundamentally alter high school sports program); Dennin, 913 F. Supp. at 670 (noting that age
rule, although facially neutral with regard to disabilities, is discriminatory when applied to a
particular student whose disability was the sole reason he was held back in school).
106. See Weston, supra note 14, at 1052.
107. Id. at 1052–53.
108. Cole v. NCAA, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1063 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (noting that NCAA
“[e]ligibility requirements shall be designed to assure proper emphasis on educational objectives,
to promote competitive equity among institutions and to prevent exploitation of studentathletes”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

THE INTERSECTION OF SPORTS AND DISABILITY

155

discrimination laws.109 Because of their learning disabilities, many students
have a specialized high school curriculum that does not meet the NCAA’s
definition of “core” academic courses. Many of these students contend the
NCAA’s imposition of a minimum grade and testing score penalizes them due
to their learning disabilities. The question raised in these cases is whether the
ADA precludes organizations such as the NCAA from enforcing academic
eligibility requirements as a condition for participating in intercollegiate
athletics and requires modification of these standards for students with learning
disabilities.110
The court in Ganden v. NCAA111 determined that such a request was
unreasonable, thereby rejecting the claim of a highly recruited swimmer
diagnosed with a learning disability since second grade to compel the NCAA
to modify its core course criteria to accept remedial courses taken as part of his
special education curriculum and to modify its GPA criteria.112 In its holding,
the court stated:
Whatever criticism one may level at GPA and the national standardized tests,
these provide significant objective predictors of a student’s ability to succeed
at college. The “core course” criteria further serves the dual interest[s] of
insuring the integrity of that GPA and independently insuring that the student
has covered the minimum subject matter required for college.113

The court determined that although the ADA requires an individualized
assessment of a learning-disabled student’s case, the law does not require the
NCAA to abandon its eligibility requirements, lower its standards, or make
modifications that “fundamentally alter” its rules and programs.114
Similar claims by athletes with learning disabilities have met varied results
in the courts. One possible explanation is that the courts or sporting authorities
are suspicious of the diagnosis or cause of the failure to meet the
requirements.115 In Tatum v. NCAA,116 after Justin Tatum failed to attain the
minimum score on the ACT needed for NCAA eligibility, his guidance
counselor, “[c]oncerned with the possible loss of [his] scholarship offer,”

109. See, e.g., Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1116 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (student-athlete
sued NCAA alleging discrimination when NCAA denied him eligibility after refusing to
recognize student’s standardized test score earned while taking the exam untimed).
110. See Doe v. Haverford Sch., No. Civ. A. 03-3989, 2003 WL 22097782, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 5, 2003) (applying Title III of the ADA to a private school).
111. No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996).
112. Id. at *1–5, *17.
113. Id. at *15.
114. Id. at *14–16.
115. In Ganden, the court agreed with the NCAA that Ganden’s remedial typing and
computer courses had little substantive similarity to the core course criteria. Id. at *15; see also
Weston, supra note 14, at 1080.
116. 992 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
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recommended that he be evaluated for learning disabilities.117 The first
evaluator concluded that Tatum did not have a learning disability and needed
to spend more time on his studies; thereafter, a second evaluator diagnosed
Tatum with generalized anxiety disorder and a test-taking phobia and
recommended he retake the ACT with accommodations.118 The testing
agencies accepted the diagnosis and provided him nonstandard, untimed
conditions for subsequent tests.119 After three more attempts, Tatum finally
made the qualifying score, which the NCAA refused to accept.120 The NCAA
required Tatum to undergo additional evaluation, in which the evaluator found
Tatum had a problem with test-taking, but not a learning disability.121
Although educational and psychiatric authorities recognized generalized
anxiety disorder and test-taking phobias as “learning disabilities,” the NCAA
refused to recognize Tatum as disabled and to modify its requirements.122 The
court agreed, finding the timing of Tatum’s diagnosis suspect and agreeing that
he had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of an ADA
claim.123 Even where a student-athlete had a long-standing record of a learning
disability, sporting authorities have been reluctant, absent litigation, to modify
academic eligibility requirements.124
The NCAA has sought dismissal of ADA-related litigation on the grounds
“that it is not a place of public accommodation and that it does not own, lease
or operate a place of public accommodation,” contending it was not subject to
the ADA.125 The court in Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n closely
analyzed this issue, determining the NCAA is subject to the ADA because of
its significant power to control, manage, or regulate places of public

117. Id. at 1117.
118. Id. at 1117–18.
119. Id. at 1118.
120. Id.
121. Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1118.
122. See id. at 1118.
123. Id. at 1123; see also Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 21, 1996) (noting that student-athlete spent five hours a day swimming as reason for
failure to meet academic requirements); Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1216 (E.D.
Wash. 2001) (noting that the NCAA argued student with learning disability failed to meet
requirement due to lack of effort).
124. For example, the NCAA refused to extend eligibility (absent litigation) to studentathletes, all of whom had received special education services to accommodate learning disabilities
prior to high school, in the following cases: Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *1, *17 (upholding
NCAA’s refusal to extend eligibility where athlete’s high school course work fell short of its
eligibility requirements); Butler v. NCAA, No. C96-1656D, 1996 WL 1058233, at *1–3 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 8, 1996) (examining NCAA’s refusal to accept athlete’s high school special
education courses, with the NCAA resisting on the grounds that it is not subject to Title III of the
ADA); Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 467 (D.N.J. 1998).
125. See, e.g., Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 483.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2005]

THE INTERSECTION OF SPORTS AND DISABILITY

157

accommodations, such as stadiums, and its control and regulation of
participation through academic eligibility standards.126
As to whether modification of academic eligibility requirements
constitutes a fundamental alteration, the NCAA has argued that its standards
do not unfairly screen out students with disabilities and that a reduction in
eligibility standards would constitute a fundamental alteration of its
program.127 The Bowers court initially determined that these standards were
essential to “maintain intercollegiate athletes as an integral part of the
educational program” and to assure that those representing an institution in
Co-defendant
intercollegiate athletics progress in their education.128
University of Iowa, which allegedly stopped recruiting Bowers after it received
his transcripts indicating special education courses, also asserted that Bowers
was not a “qualified individual” with a disability.129 As Northwestern
successfully asserted in Knapp, Iowa argued that Bowers was not disabled
simply because he could not participate in intercollegiate sports.130 Iowa also
argued that Bowers was not discriminated against “because of” his learning
disability, but was instead denied eligibility due to his failure to fulfill the core
course and GPA requirements.131 In a later ruling on summary judgment, the
same court rejected both arguments, holding that the defendants had not
proved the eligibility requirements were essential to the maintenance of
intercollegiate athletics, and requiring an individualized, rather than purely
numerical, assessment of a student’s ability to comport with program goals.132
In response to the foregoing discrimination complaints filed by studentathletes with learning disabilities, the United States Department of Justice
126. Id. at 489; see also supra Section II.C.1.
127. See, e.g., Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 477, 500 (denying Bowers’s request for a preliminary
injunction); see also Weston, supra note 14, at 1086–88.
128. See Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
129. Id. at 467, 475.
130. Id. at 476. Contrast Knapp v. Northwestern University, 101 F.3d 473, 478–82 (7th Cir.
1996), which held that a student’s heart condition did not constitute a disability because the
student was only limited in playing intercollegiate sports, which by itself is not a major life
activity, with Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 475–76, involving a student who was “disabled” under the
ADA not because of a limitation on his ability to play college sports but because of a limitation
on his capacity to learn, and was denied the ability to participate in, among other things,
intercollegiate football due to that disability. See also Weston, supra note 14, at 1087–88; Susan
M. Denbo, Disability Lessons in Higher Education: Accommodating Learning-Disabled Students
and Student-Athletes Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 41
AM. BUS. L.J. 145, 174–75 (2003) (noting that many schools fail to raise the “obvious” argument
that participation in sports is not a substantial limitation that renders one disabled).
131. Bowers, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 476.
132. Id. at 478. The court acknowledged that although the NCAA has a “waiver procedure”
that allows students to apply for an exception to the rules, the waiver decisions are made too late,
only after students are enrolled in a college and have lost recruiting and scholarship opportunities.
Id. at 476–77.
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(DOJ), charged with enforcement of Title III of the ADA, investigated the
NCAA’s initial eligibility certification process.133 The DOJ determined that
several aspects of the NCAA’s initial eligibility requirements violated Title III
of the ADA, in particular the “core course” definition that explicitly excluded
any remedial, special education, or compensatory courses.134 On May 26,
1998, the NCAA entered into a Consent Decree with the DOJ agreeing to
revise certain procedures and policies with respect to student-athletes with
learning disabilities.135 The NCAA entered the Consent Decree even though
no court had yet ruled that a learning disabled student-athlete had a reasonable
probability of succeeding on the merits of a disability discrimination claim
against the NCAA.136 Expressly in the Consent Decree, however, the NCAA
maintains that it is not subject to Title III of the ADA and denies any liability
under the ADA.137 The Consent Decree expired by its own terms May 1,
2003.138 The NCAA continues to provide a process for accommodating
students with learning disabilities.139
In the few court decisions issued since the Consent Decree, the NCAA has
continued to assert that it is not subject to the ADA, yet this argument has less
force with the courts since the Consent Decree and the decision in Martin v.
PGA.140 Other researchers have noted that “[a] review of cases decided before
and after the Consent Decree was signed illustrates that it has not yet
133. Consent Decree, United States v. NCAA (D.D.C. May 26, 1998) [hereinafter Decree],
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/ncaa.htm.
134. Id.
135. See id. Under the Decree, the NCAA agreed to certify as “core courses” classes
designed for students with disabilities that provide them with the same type of knowledge and
skills as other college-bound students; permit ineligible learning disabled students to earn a fourth
year of eligibility by making substantial progress towards an academic degree; include experts on
learning disabilities in evaluating waiver applications; and pay $35,000 to four student athletes
who had filed complaints with the DOJ. Id.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Decree, supra note 133.
This Consent Decree shall remain in effect until May 1, 2003. At that time, this Consent
Decree shall terminate unless the United States moves for cause for an extension. This
Court [the District Court for the District of Columbia] retains jurisdiction over this case
for the purpose of deciding any issue that may arise under this Consent Decree, and for
purposes of enforcement of this Consent Decree. Any party may bring such issues before
the Court by filing an appropriate motion.
Id.
139. See generally NCAA Student-Athlete Eligibility FAQ, http://www1.ncaa.org/
membership/membership_svcs/eligibility-recruiting/faqs/disabilities (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
140. See, e.g., Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1222–23 (E.D. Wash. 2001)
(holding that Title III applied to the NCAA based on the NCAA’s large degree of control over
students’ access to the arena of college athletics); see also Kelly M. Trainor, Note, The NCAA’s
Initial Eligibility Requirements and the Americans with Disabilities Act in the Post-PGA Tour,
Inc. v. Martin Era: An Argument in Favor of Deference to the NCAA, 46 B.C. L. REV 423 (2005).
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significantly improved a learning-disabled student’s chances of successfully
challenging an NCAA certification decision.”141 Because the law would
require the NCAA to analyze waiver requests on an individualized basis,
obviously not all requests need be granted. The court in Matthews v. NCAA
required waiver for a learning disabled student from the NCAA rule requiring
75% credit hours be taken during the school year, so long as the student
“maintains the minimum grade point average and progression toward his
degree.”142 The court held that this was a necessary and reasonable
modification of NCAA bylaws and not a fundamental alteration the NCAA’s
purpose.143 By contrast, the court in Cole v. NCAA,144 deferred to the NCAA
and stated that Title III “does not require an institution to ‘lower or to effect
substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped
person.’”145
C. Athletes Who Need Accommodation or Modification to Rules of Play
Under the questions previously explored, courts or sporting authorities
determined eligibility to compete on the basis of medical or academic fitness
standards but did not intervene in the actual rules of play and competition.146
Application of the disability laws becomes more controversial and perhaps
problematic when the laws appear to require modifications or accommodations
to actual rules of play or competition for disabled athletes, particularly at the
professional level. Should the law distinguish between rules defining who is
eligible to compete from rules governing how the game is played, with any
modification to the latter “substantive” rules as a per se fundamental
alteration?147 Most professional teams or organizations do not receive federal
financial assistance and are not covered by the Rehabilitation Act. In the few
disability discrimination cases brought by professional athletes, the athletes
have invoked Title I (employment) and Title III (public accommodations) of
the ADA to seek legal relief.
141. Denbo, supra note 130, at 193; see Jenny Blayden & Cynthia Pemberton, An
Investigation of NCAA Initial Eligibility Waiver Applications and Awards from 1999 to 2001, 13
J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 39, 50 (2003) (stating that “[d]espite voluntary agreement with the
Justice Department as articulated by the Consent Decree, as well as evolving case law, the NCAA
has consistently rejected the notion that it is a place of public accommodation and therefore
legally compelled to comply with Title III of the ADA” and urging continued tracking and
accountability of NCAA compliance).
142. Matthews, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.
143. Id.
144. 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
145. Id. at 1070 (quoting Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 40 F.3d 926, 931
(8th Cir. 1994)).
146. See supra discussion in Parts III.A–B.
147. The PGA set forth this argument, among others, in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S.
661, 670 (2001).
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The case prompting national attention and debate on this question involved
Casey Martin, a professional golfer, who due to a severe congenital disability
affecting his right leg, sought to compel the PGA to waive its “no cart” rule
and permit him to ride a cart during PGA competitions.148 The PGA did not
contest that Martin was disabled; however, it argued that the ADA does not
apply to professional golf tournaments,149 and moreover, that walking is an
essential substantive rule of competition and any modification would
fundamentally alter the nature of the competition.150
The Court’s opinion focused on whether modification of the no-cart rule
for Martin to participate in PGA professional golf competitions was reasonable
or would fundamentally alter the nature of the game.151 Thus, acknowledging
that the ADA requires “reasonable accommodation” for qualified individuals
with a disability, the debate centered on when accommodation to rules of
competitive play is ever “reasonable”?152 From the PGA’s view, walking is
integral to the spirit and conduct of the game of golf; riding in a cart is a
decided advantage to a player; the PGA Tour is entitled to set its own rules of
play without interference of the courts; and the no-cart rule was necessary to
ensure competition fairness and a level playing field.153 The PGA also argued
that the purpose of the walking rule is to inject the element of fatigue into the
skill of shot-making and that changing the rule would fundamentally alter the
competition.154 Martin adduced evidence that riding in a cart is not necessarily
an advantage, that in many ways it is a disadvantage, and that most players
would not use a cart even if permitted.155
The Court framed the question as whether the walking rule could be
modified to accommodate Martin without fundamentally altering the nature of
the game being played at the PGA Tour’s tournaments.156 The Court noted

148. Id. at 668–69.
149. See id. at 678. The Court’s ruling with respect to the application of the ADA to the PGA
is discussed in Section II.C.1. See also id. at 678–80 (analyzing the PGA as a “public
accommodation” subject to the ADA on (among other) grounds that, although Martin was a
competitor, and not “clients or customers” of a public accommodation, “it would be entirely
appropriate to classify the golfers who pay petitioner $3,000 for the chance to compete in the QSchool and, if successful, in the subsequent tour events, as petitioner’s clients or customers”).
150. Id. at 670.
151. Id. at 681–91.
152. See PGA, 532 U.S. at 681–91.
153. Id. at 670–671; see also W. Kent Davis, Why is the PGA Teed Off at Casey Martin? An
Example of How the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Has Changed Sports Law, 9 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 1, 41–43 (1998) (citing the varied comments of the public and professional golfers
responding to the Martin accommodation issue).
154. PGA, 532 U.S. at 686.
155. Id. at 687–88. In testimony at trial, professional golfer Eric Johnson indicated that
walking might even be an advantage, as it helps keep him “in rhythm.” Id. at 688.
156. Id. at 682.
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that the Rules of Golf permitted cart use and otherwise said nothing requiring
or defining walking as part of the game.157 The Court treated the PGA’s
fatigue argument with slight sarcasm, noting “the factual basis of petitioner’s
argument is undermined by the District Court’s finding that the fatigue from
walking during one of petitioner’s 4-day tournaments cannot be deemed
significant.”158 Although acknowledging that fatigue was part of the game, the
Court found “it is an uncontested finding of the District Court that Martin
‘easily endures greater fatigue even with a cart than his able-bodied
competitors do by walking.’”159 In these cases, the central issue is whether
allowing the plaintiff, given his individual circumstances, the requested
modification of using a cart in tournament competition would fundamentally
alter PGA golf competitions.160 In holding the walking rule “at best
peripheral” to the nature of the PGA competition and that waiver of the rule for
Martin was reasonable, the Court considered this consistent with
Congressional intent to require entities such as the PGA to give individualized
attention to requests of disabled athletes for access to participation in
competition.161
Even the members of the Court were divided. Was Martin getting an
unfair advantage? Is walking integral to the game? What is a level playing
field? Where do we draw the line?162 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, argued in dissent that sport is different from other enterprises which
are subject to the ADA and that no court, “not even the Supreme Court of the
United States,” can pronounce one or another of the competitive rules of sport
157. Id. at 666.
158. Id. at 687 (citing evidence presented at trial showing that fatigue in golf was more
attributable to dehydration and heat exhaustion and that one burns only 500 calories in a five-hour
round of golf, “nutritionally . . . less than a Big Mac”).
159. PGA, 532 U.S. at 690 (citing Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1252 (D. Or.
1998)).
160. Id. at 682.
161. Id. at 689–91.
162. Based on Martin, the Supreme Court summarily vacated the Seventh Circuit ruling that
denied the request by Ford Olinger, a professional golfer with a degenerative hip disorder, for
injunctive relief to ride a cart in the U.S. Open. See Olinger v. USGA, 18 Fed. App’x. 409, 409
(7th Cir. 2001). The Seventh Circuit had affirmed the district court’s ruling that “the nature of
the competition would be fundamentally altered” if the walking rule were eliminated because it
would “remove stamina (at least, a particular type of stamina) from the set of qualities designed to
be tested in this competition.” Olinger v. USGA, 55 F. Supp. 2d 926, 937 (N.D. Ind. 1999), aff’d,
205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 532 U.S. 1064 (2001). The Seventh
Circuit had determined that the administrative burdens of evaluating requests to waive the
walking rule were undue, in that the United States Golf Association (USGA) “would need to
develop a system and a fund of expertise to determine whether a given applicant truly needs, or
merely wants, or could use but does not need, to ride a cart to compete.” Olinger, 205 F.3d at
1007 (stating that “the decision on whether the rules of the game should be adjusted to
accommodate him is best left to those who hold the future of golf in trust”).
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nonessential if the rulemaker deems them otherwise.163 As posed by Justice
Scalia, why must the PGA play “classic ‘essential’ golf?”164 How does a
sporting entity or a court determine whether the rule or policy that a disabled
athlete seeks to modify would alter a fundamental aspect of the competition?
What is discrimination on the basis of disability when it comes to sports and
athletic competition? Justice Scalia was concerned about “line drawing”
problems and unwarranted judicial interference. He posed a seemingly absurd
scenario where a Little League player with attention deficit disorder, whose
disability “makes it at least 25% more difficult to hit a pitched ball,” should
receive the accommodation of four strikes absent “a judicial determination
that, in baseball, three strikes are metaphysically necessary.”165
Courts have not interpreted Martin to require an affirmative response to
many accommodation requests. In Kuketz v. Petronelli,166 a nationally ranked
wheelchair racquetball player sued to be allowed to compete with footed
players in the athletic club’s “A” racquetball league and requested a rule
modification to allow him two bounces before returning the ball, as was legal
in wheelchair racquetball, rather than one bounce.167 Relying on the analysis
in Martin, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that while the essence of
golf was hitting a stationary ball with a club, the essence of racquetball was
hitting a moving ball with a racquet before the second bounce.168 Allowing a
player two bounces would fundamentally change the nature of the game.169
Implicit in wheelchair racquetball’s official rules was the assumption that all
players were in wheelchairs.170
IV. CONCLUSION
Recent media attention has focused on the tragedy of some perfectly
healthy athletes, still not satisfied, who turn to purported performanceenhancing drugs in order to strive to become the best in their respective sports
competitions. In many respects, athletes with disabilities are perhaps more
163. PGA, 532 U.S. at 700.
164. Id. at 699.
165. Id. at 702–03.
166. 821 N.E.2d 473 (Mass. 2005).
167. Id. at 474.
168. Id. at 479.
169. Id. at 479–80.
170. See id. at 480.
Giving a wheelchair player two bounces and a footed player one bounce in head-to-head
competition is a variation of the official rules that would “alter such an essential aspect of
the game . . . that it would be unacceptable even if it affected all competitors equally.”
The modifications sought by Kuketz create a new game, with new strategies and new
rules. The club is certainly free to establish or enter into a league that plays this variation
of racquetball, but it is not required by the ADA to do so.
Id. at 479–80 (quoting PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 682 (2001)).
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worthy of participation than non-disabled athletes—they have worked equally
hard to develop their athletic skills—yet they may be denied the opportunity to
participate because of a disability, medical impairment, or need for
accommodation in either the rules of play or participation. An equally
compelling consideration, however, is the obligation of athletic programs to
ensure the health and safety of athletes, as well as to ensure fairness in
competitive play.
The federal disability laws provide athletes with disabilities a vital
mechanism to ensure that decisions regarding their rights to participate in
athletics are thoughtfully considered, medically justified, and not disregarded
simply upon notions of undue administrative burdens, false notions of
competitive advantage, or paternalism. The common thread among Martin and
cases involving challenges by athletes with disabilities illustrates that sporting
organizations should be prepared to explain the purpose of their eligibility
requirements and rules of competition, to articulate the connection between the
requirements and purpose, and to evaluate on an individual basis whether
modification of such rules can be made without undermining this legitimate
purpose or fundamentally altering the nature of the game. The playing field
becomes balanced when athletes with disabilities are also given an equal
opportunity to participate.
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